HIGH-ALTITUDE COLD INJURY IN THE EIGHTH AIR FORCE "Until the epidemics of cold injury occurred in the European theater in the fall and winter of 1944, frostbite among flying personnel had constituted the only important problem of this kind. Ground troops stationed in Ireland had encountered extremely cold weather, but under noncombat conditions, which in no way paralleled the conditions confronting troops on the Continent in the winter of 1944-45. The dangers which confronted the Army Air Forces were also not parallel to those which ground troops encountered, but certain aspects of the experience are sufficiently instructive to make it worthwhile to tell the story briefly.
Incidence From the beginning of operations in Europe, in 1942, until the end of the fighting on the Continent, in May 1945, varying proportions of all casualties in airborne personnel of the Eighth Air Force could be attributed to high-altitude frostbite. It was pointed out in the August 1944 issue of
Monthly Progress Report, Army Service Forces, War Department, 31 Aug. 1944, Section 7: Health. that, during the fiscal year 1943-44, more crew members returning from operational missions had sustained cold injuries than had sustained wounds from enemy action. These losses were serious. A third of all frostbite casualties required hospitalization, and, even when the injuries were mild, flying personnel had to be grounded for 4 to 14 days. A surgeon, speaking on the subject at a general hospital staff conference, warned that the situation constituted a real emergency, since many of the men hospitalized would not return to duty for months, if ever.
Annual reports for the years 1943, 1944, and 1945, by Col. (later Maj. Gen..) Malcolm C. Grow, MC, Surgeon, Eighth Air Force, contain analyses of the casualties from cold injuries, as follows:
For the 14-month period ending in December 1943, 1,634 men were removed from flying duty because of cold injuries incurred on high-altitude operational missions. Over the same period, 1,207 men were removed from flying duty because of injuries incurred in action against the enemy. In 1943, each casualty from cold injury lost an average of 10.5 days from flying duty, and 7 percent, according to an analysis of a sample of 200 consecutive casualties from this cause, were permanently lost to airborne crewmen.
In 1944, although the numbers of casualties from all causes increased as the rate of combat was stepped up, the situation in respect to cold injury was considerably improved; 1,685 men were lost from this cause in a total of 3,158 men removed from flying duty. The average number of days lost from duty because of cold injury fell to 4.7.
In 1945, the situation was still further improved. Between 1 January and the end of the fighting on 8 May, there were only 151 injuries from high-altitude cold in 149 crewmen, compared with 3,852 injuries from combat missiles.
Causes of Cold Injury
The occurrence of high-altitude cold injury was found, on analysis, to be related to a number of considerations. Some of them were obvious, such as the season of the year and the altitude. Most of the missions were carried out about 25,000 feet above sea level, where the free-air temperature, using December 1943 as an illustration, ranged from 22.4º to -45.4º F. (-30.2º to -43.6º C.). In 1944, temperatures as low as -60º F. (-51.1º C.) were encountered.
The position of the crew members in the plane had much to do both with their chances of contracting cold injury and with the location of the injury. In heavy bombers, waist, tail, and ball-turret gunners were particularly vulnerable. The two waist gunners occupied the most exposed position. Injuries from wind blast were frequent for several reasons. The wind entered through openings for gun mounts. The gunners removed the gun-cover assembly because it interfered with the operation of their guns. They left the waist hatch open for the same reason, as well as to reduce chances of surprise by enemy bombers. The radio operator also left the hatch open to avoid surprise.
In 1943, waist gunners and radio operators sustained considerably more frostbite of the face, neck, and ears than men in other positions, though injuries in these locations influenced losses from duty less than did injuries of the hands and feet. The upper-turret and ball-turret gunners were particularly likely to sustain injuries of the feet. Tail gunners suffered heavily from frostbite of the hands and feet but more often sustained frostbite of the face, neck, and ears. Ball-turret gunners suffered equally from frostbite of the hands and face but more heavily from injuries of the feet. Gunners in any position who removed their gloves to clean jammed guns or to change ammunition belts were instantly frostbitten when they touched cold metal with their bare hands.
During 1943, gunners in the waist, tail, ball turret, and upper turret of bombers, together with the radio operator, sustained 75 percent of all injuries from frostbite in the United States Army Air Forces in Europe. Gunners whose position was not stated in the reports sustained another 8 percent of cold injuries. Waist gunners and tail gunners sustained 64 percent of all cold injuries. The number of casualties was reduced as time passed, but their proportionate distribution among crewmen (lid not alter materially during the war.
Up to July 1943, injuries of the hands accounted for more than half of all cold injuries in the Eighth Air Force (table 7) and injuries of the face, neck, and ears to less than a fifth. Thereafter, the proportions were reversed, and injuries of the face, neck, and ears accounted for the majority of these injuries. This was a decided improvement, since, as has been pointed out, injuries in these areas were less serious in terms of manpower losses.
The largest single cause of high-altitude frostbite was wind blast, which was responsible for 39 percent of all cases in the 14-month period ending in December 1943 and for almost 55 percent of all cases in 1944. The remaining cases were due chiefly to lack of equipment, failure of equipment, and removal of equipment which should have continued in use. The first few months of aerial warfare in Europe clearly revealed that Air Force personnel, including medical personnel, had not been adequately trained in the prevention of cold injury. They had been fully alerted to such dangers as flak and air collisions, but most of them did not know how to protect themselves against the dangers of cold, nor, because they had not been instructed in its use, did they know the proper use of the equipment supplied to them. The highest incidence of cold injury occurred in new groups and in replacement crews in older groups; these men had not been trained in prevention and did not understand the use and maintenance of protective clothing.
Corrective and Preventive Measures
When once the factors contributing to the severe losses from high-altitude frostbite were understood, corrective measures were promptly instituted. An intensive investigation was carried out in March 1943, after a sharp increase in casualties from this cause had occurred in February. One of the principal causes was found to be shortages of electrically heated boots and gloves. Until additional American equipment could be supplied, the difficulty was temporarily relieved by modification of gloves and boots used by British airmen to permit their use with American flying suits. The investigation in March 1943 also revealed that failure of electricity in the planes was responsible for some failures of equipment, that large numbers of injuries were occurring because portions of the face and neck were unprotected, and that casualties in heavy bombardment aircraft were suffering from cold injury after wounding because of lack of warm blankets. It was also found that crewmen who occupied protected positions not infrequently suffered cold injuries from wind blast after damage to the plane by enemy missiles.
After these discoveries, a number of new items of equipment were devised by the Air Surgeon's Office and other service departments, working in cooperation. Among these new items were the following:
1. Protectors for the face and neck, so designed as to cover the oxygen mask. The crewmen had previously complained that the face masks supplied interfered with the use of the new type of oxygen mask and were also impractical because they allowed the goggles to cloud over.
2. A small, mufflike heated unit into which hands and feet could be inserted if the standard gloves and boots became useless because of failure of the plane's electrical system.
3. Electrically heated canvas bags, several of which were supplied to each heavy bomber, to keep the wounded warm, reduce shock, and prevent further cold injury.
4. Electrically heated blankets for the wounded to use if their electrically heated flying suits had to be cut away to control hemorrhage or if the heating system of the plane was destroyed by enemy action.
5. Warm, light, and flexible gloves (devised by the surgeon of the Eighth Air Force), which did not have to be removed to release jammed guns. The men were warned that their hands would be frostbitten if they removed their gloves, and it was demonstrated to them that a locked gun could usually be released just as readily with gloved as with ungloved hands.
Electrically Heated Flying Suits
The F-1 for the B-17... a one-piece coverall-type garments worn under the standard two-piece winter flying suit. Electric heated gloves and shoes were also included. Like an electric blanket, the wires were sewn into the wool fabric. Each suit had a 2-foot power cord and a 6-foot extension cord. Gloves and shoes had electrical connectors. These version 1 suits experienced wiring breakages. Wired in a series, a single break would cause the entire suit to lose power...
The F-2 electric heated flying suit was standardized in August 1943. It was comprised of four main pieces – electric heated jacket, electric heated trousers, unheated outher jacket, and unheated outer trousers. ...incorporated more flexible wiring than in previous suits. It was wired in parallel, rather than in a series, to eliminate failure problems with breakages. Without current, the suit was comfortable down to 32°F. With current, it was comfortable down to -30°F. It also had a connection to plug in a B-8 goggle or oxygen mask heater. The F-2A suit added thermostats to control the heat in February 1944...
The F-3 suit was a further improvement, providing comfort at -60°. The F-3 improved on the electrical controls and fittings and the parallel wiring system, which still supplied half the heat if one of the two circuits failed. The F-3A continued to improve the electrical controls, fittings, and wiring."
thearrowheadclub.com/tag/electrically-heated-flight-...
Here are good resources about the suits. There was a two-foot cord that connected to a six-foot extension cord. They plugged into the closest rheostat, but it allowed some movement, yet they'd have to unplug to assist a fellow crew member.
www.303rdbg.com/uniforms-gear9.htmlwww.303rdbg.com/uniforms-gear4.htmlwww.303rdbg.com/nored-f2booklet.pdfwww.303rdbg.com/nored-f3booklet.pdfIf you wanted to add realism there are three related points I'd consider...
(I am working on a variant)(1) Just my opinion, but I would assume that Light Wounds have not disrupted the integrity of the electric suit; while Serious Wounds, depending on the description of the wound, have disrupted the wiring. Therefore the need to use heated bags and blankets.
(2) If you wanted to add realism like that you also need to remember that the Nose, Cockpit, and Radio Room also had Compartment Heat, and the Seriously wounded Waist or Tail gunner could be moved to the heated Radio Room.
(3) Also, on the return trip to base, many times the formation would already have descended to 10,000 feet in Zone 3 or especially 2, which lessened the chances of Frostbite.
